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The ‘brain disease’ concept in addiction: A cause for ambivalence not 
concern 
 Kylie Morphett and Carla Meurk UQ Centre for Clinical Research, Brisbane, Australia 
 Hammer et al (2013) present some interesting empirical work on addicted persons’ understanding of neurobiological research on addiction. They use their findings to argue that it may be “harmful” to describe addiction as a “brain disease”. Empirical research of this type is important because we lack good information on the way in which addicted individuals incorporate neurobiological information into their self-understandings. While we agree with a number of their arguments, our own empirical research suggests that their concerns about the harms of the brain disease language are overstated.   
Language matters: appraising the social impact of addiction neuroscience Hammer et al (2013) argue that neurobiological explanations of addiction may be helpful in reducing addicted persons’ self-blame and reinforcing their responsibility for obtaining treatment. They are careful to distinguish between the value of a “biological” explanation of addiction and the use of the label of “disease”. We agree that it is theoretically and methodologically important to do so. In our research, addicted individuals often accept neurobiological understandings of addiction while rejecting the idea that addiction is a “disease”, and vice versa. It is therefore important that researchers conducting empirical research in this area are clear in asking addicted individuals how neuroscientific 
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information impacts on their understandings of drug use and also what their attitudes are towards labeling addiction as a “brain disease.”   Equally important is something that Hammer et al overlook, namely, the distinction between the idea of addiction as a “disease” and the more specific variant that it is a “brain disease”. Hammer et al use the terms interchangeably so it is not clear which term their participants were responding to. As they note, the claim that addiction is a disease has a long history in the clinical literature and in self-help groups such as Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous (White, 1998). The insertion of the word “brain” into the disease discourse about addiction is a newer development that may have important effects on the way people interpret the disease model of addiction and whether they are willing to accept it, either to understand themselves or others. It is essential that there is clarity and consistency in way these two disease concepts of addiction are discussed with interviewees.   Our group is currently exploring these subtleties in qualitative and quantitative research with a cross-section of the Australian public (Meurk, Carter, Hall and Lucke. 2013). We are finding that while many people are prepared to believe that brain-based explanations are useful in understanding addiction, there is much more ambivalence about the concept of addiction as a “brain disease”; acceptance of the value of the former does not entail acceptance of the latter.   We find a slightly more pronounced distinction in our qualitative research with individuals addicted to nicotine, heroin or opioids. We have encountered 
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frequent, but not unanimous, resistance to the idea that addiction is a “brain disease”. These individuals accept that the effects of addictive drugs can be usefully understood neurobiologically but reject the framing of addiction as a brain disease. Disentangling these complex responses is central to developing framings of addiction that might be beneficial to addicted individuals.  
Brain matters: could the brain disease model be harmful? Hammer et al’s central concern is that the brain disease model of addiction is a form of biological reductionism that will come to dominate public discourse and marginalize alternative explanations. The consequences, they argue, could cause harm by perpetuating negative social perceptions of addicted individuals or restricting the types of treatment that are available. The research conducted by our group on public understandings of addiction challenges this view and provides some reassurance to those concerned about negative social impacts of biological reductionism.  Meurk, Carter, Hall and Lucke (2013) asked 55 members of the Australian public what they thought addiction was and how they thought it was caused. Common explanatory frames identified by participants included: character (e.g., willpower, choice), emotions and experience (e.g., buzz, escapism), society and environment (family, peers and institutions), learning and behavior, and biology (e.g., body, brain, physical dependence). Just over 50% referred to the brain in their explanations but this was not at the expense of other factors: participants typically provided multifactorial explanations that included a number of different themes, often linked together. Of particular interest is the fact that 
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social explanations were more commonly invoked than biological ones. These results suggest that the complexity of addiction is appreciated by members of the Australian public.   The same project has also explored how medicalized discourse about nicotine addiction has affected public attitudes toward smoking cessation (Morphett, Lucke, Gartner, Carter, Meurk, Hall, 2013). Participants were asked what they thought would be the best way to treat nicotine addiction and why. Pharmacological treatments for nicotine addiction were the most commonly mentioned methods of quitting but unassisted quitting was often considered the ideal method. Pharmacological cessation aids were frequently mentioned in conjunction with behavioral strategies and counseling. These findings show that medical discourse has not displaced alternatives ways of talking about nicotine addiction: the themes of willpower, motivation and individual choice remain central to public discourse about quitting.   These findings suggest that neurobiological discourse about addiction has not been adopted wholeheartedly or unquestioningly by the Australian public. Rather, such discourse is more likely to be integrated into lay understandings of addiction rather than displaced.   Like Hammer at al, we have also found that the brain disease model is not wholeheartedly accepted by neuroscientists and neurobiologically-informed clinicians in the addiction field (Bell, Carter, Mathews, Gartner, Lucke and Hall, 2013). Most of the addiction clinicians and neuroscientists we interviewed about 
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the brain disease model did not uncritically endorse it and many expressed mixed views about its potential impacts on patient behavior. Some believed that promoting the brain disease model of addiction would increase motivation for treatment but they were also concerned that it could also encourage fatalism or diminish the role of social drivers of addiction. This research accords with findings of Pickergsill (2009) in the United Kingdom that scientists involved in neurobiological research have complex and nuanced ideas about the aetiology of mental disorders that acknowledge the importance of social factors such as family upbringing, socioeconomic status and the social environment.  Further research is needed to assess how these complex expert and lay mental models of addiction affect empathic and/or judgmental responses to addicted individuals. Nevertheless, the evidence to date should moderate fears that uptake of a neurobiological conception of addiction will lead to a biological reductionism that increases rather than decreases stigma. We agree with the authors of a recent review of research on the impact of neuroscientific ideas on personhood:   “The neuroscientific ideas that reach the public sphere do not encounter passive receptacles of information, but active audiences who approach it through the lens of pre- existing worldviews, assumptions and agendas. Neuroscience is open to a multiplicity of interpretations and uses in society, and has a corresponding multiplicity of effects.” (O’Connor & Joffe, 2013, p10)  
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Our research to date indicates that the public, addicted individuals, and neuroscientists accept complex views of addiction that acknowledge the role of environmental factors and individual motivation as much as neurobiology. Like that of Hammer et al (2013), our research suggests that neurobiological framings of addiction may potentially be useful to addicted individuals. However, further social research into public understandings of addiction is needed in order to unravel complexities in language and develop ways of framing work on the neurobiology of addiction that will improve public discourse and better integrate lay beliefs about the importance of willpower, motivation and individual choice in overcoming addiction.   References Bell, S., Carter, A., Mathews, R., Gartner, C.E., Lucke, J., and Hall. W. 2013. Views of addiction neuroscientists and clinicians on the clinical impact of a 'Brain disease model of addiction'. Neuroethics. doi: 10.1007/s12152-013-9177-9 Hammer, R., Dingel, M., Ostergren, J., Partridge, B., McCormick, J. and Koenig, B.A. 2013. Addiction: Current criticism of the brain disease paradigm. AJOB 
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